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2.1  Introduction 
The possibility of Britain’s participation in the Exchange Rate Mech- 
anism  of  the  European  Monetary  System has  once  again been the 
subject of speculation. In many respects this would represent the quite 
natural outcome of  a continued evolution towards a more pragmatic 
approach to the conduct of  monetary policy which has increasingly 
emphasized a broader range of  financial indicators, including the ex- 
change rate. This retreat from the purist monetarist perspective of the 
early years of Mrs. Thatcher’s administration has been prompted on 
one hand by the difficulties encountered in controlling the original target 
aggregate, fM3, and on the other by the excessive volatility  of the 
exchange rate and accompanying swings in competitiveness. The aim 
of  this paper will be, first, to try to shed a little light on the reasons 
for this exchange rate volatility and, second, to ask whether it has done 
any lasting damage to British industrial performance. 
Table 2.1 presents data on the nominal and real exchange rate (mea- 
sured by relative producer prices) since the advent of floating, together 
with a number of  other macroeconomic indicators. The 17% nominal 
appreciation of sterling between 1978 and 1981 in particular stands out. 
Associated with this there was a 23% deterioration in competitiveness 
and a contraction in manufacturing output of 14%. While manufacturing 
output has since recovered somewhat as  competitiveness has improved, 
it is still well below its 1978 peak. The reduction in overall economic 
growth is, by contrast, less pronounced, and national income now stands 
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39 Table 2.1  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
Nominal Effective  Relative  GDP at  Gross Oil  Retail 
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Sources: Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends Annuul Supplement 1987 and Petroleum Economist. 41  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
more than 11% above its 1979 value. Unemployment, however, has risen 
remorselessly and only very recently has shown signs of falling. 
While the facts of the recession are clear, its causes are open to 
debate. The appreciation of sterling and the associated squeeze on the 
tradable  sector could  be  the  result  of  at least  two forces.  First,  it 
coincided with the adoption of contractionary fiscal and, more partic- 
ularly, monetary policies by the newly elected Conservative adminis- 
tration. In a world of sluggish wage or price adjustment, an unexpected 
reduction in monetary growth is likely to produce an initial overap- 
preciation of the exchange rate and a contraction that is concentrated 
in  the tradables  sector (see Dornbusch  1976 and  Buiter and  Miller 
1981a, for instance). Buiter and Miller (1981b) cite this as a primary 
cause of the downturn beginning in  1979. On this explanation the ap- 
preciation  of  sterling was a temporary misalignment associated  with 
the transition to a new, low-inflation, growth path. 
The second explanation lays the blame on sterling’s growing impor- 
tance as a petrocurrency. The figures for gross oil production in table 
2.1 show that between 1978 and 1982 the share of oil increased fourfold.’ 
Indeed, by  1985 the United Kingdom, with 6% of free-world output, 
had become the fourth largest producer in the non-Communist world, 
after the United States, Saudia Arabia, and Mexico. In the space of 
ten years, the United  Kingdom had been transformed from total de- 
pendence on imported oil into a significant net oil exporter. Further, 
the doubling of oil prices in the wake of the Iranian revolution signif- 
icantly  increased the value of  this oil wealth. The “Dutch  disease” 
literature suggests that the discovery and exploitation of such natural 
wealth  will  require  an appreciation of  the real  exchange rate  if  the 
benefits of the resource discovery are to be enjoyed. The result will 
be  a  contraction  in  the output of  nonoil tradables  coupled  with  an 
expansion in nontradables production. Forsyth and Kay (1980), among 
others, have attributed the strength of sterling at the start of the 1980s 
to the importance of oil. On this explanation the appreciation of the 
exchange rate represented a reassessment of underlying fundamentals, 
rather than a temporary misalignment, and the accompanying unem- 
ployment  was  a purely  temporary  phenomenon  associated  with  the 
process of structural change.* 
In an attempt to disentangle the relative  importance of these two 
explanations for the dramatic movements in the real exchange rate, I 
have conducted a few counterfactual simulations with a small empirical 
macroeconomic model of the United Kingdom. The results, presented 
in the first part of the paper, suggest that the presence of oil and the 
second oil price shock can account for something like a 12-percentage- 
point appreciation of both nominal and real exchange rates between 
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capable of explaining the rest, however. A combination of restrictive 
monetary policy and adverse supply-side movements can, on the other 
hand, provide an explanation of both the appreciation and the rise in 
unemployment. 
Whatever the causes of  the appreciation, it still prompts questions 
about  the magnitude of  the costs imposed  on the economy.  To  the 
extent that demand and activity are transitorily reduced below equi- 
librium levels, there is a temporary welfare loss. However, temporary 
fluctuations in exchange rates may well have permanent effects on the 
economy. Such hysteresis effects have recently attracted attention in 
the context of labor markets (see Blanchard and Summers 1986, Gre- 
gory  1986, and  Lindbeck and  Snower  1986, for instance).  In these 
models the current “natural  rate”  of unemployment may depend on 
the past history of the unemployment rate; for example, because the 
currently employed (“insiders”) do not take account of the wishes of 
the unemployed (“outsiders”), or because firms use the unemployment 
history of a worker as a screening device, or simply because the human 
capital of the unemployed depreciates. 
Similar hysteresis effects could arise in  traded-goods markets for a 
number of reasons. On the demand side, customers may develop brand 
loyalty through purchasing a commodity and thus be more inclined to 
repeat the purchase.  On the supply side, producers may experience 
significant costs in entering export markets, for example, in setting up 
distribution networks (see Baldwin and Krugman  1986) or more gen- 
erally in increasing their market share. Once producers have left the 
market it  may be difficult to reenter. In the face of a temporary  ap- 
preciation, producers may then be inclined to cut margins and even 
incur losses in order to maintain market share. Both casual empiricism 
and the available aggregate data suggest that this was indeed the case 
during the 1979-82  period. 
The view that hysteresis effects may be important in traded goods 
markets has also been voiced by industrialists themselves. Thus Vick- 
ers, in giving evidence to a House of Lords Select Committee set up 
to investigate the decline in British manufacturing, expressed the view 
that “The withdrawal by the UK from a number of important sectors 
of manufacturing industry represents a permanent loss to the UK econ- 
omy. . . . Once a company, or country, has opted out of a particular 
industry it is virtually impossible ever to reenter.” 
The second half of this paper supplements this superficial evidence 
of the importance of hysteresis effects with econometric evidence con- 
cerning U.K. export performance since 1900. I find evidence of such 
effects on both the demand and supply side of the market. The paper 
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2.2  The 1979-81 Appreciation: Oil or Tight Money? 
It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive  survey and as- 
sessment of  the Thatcher years in general and the  1979-81  recession 
in particular. That has been done by others, for example, Buiter and 
Miller (1981b, 1983) and Matthews and Minford (1987). Rather I want 
to focus on the behavior of the exchange rate, supplementing existing, 
often  informa',  discussions with  some  pseudoeconometric  evidence 
from a small i inual macroeconometric model of the United Kingdom. 
The model lie.,  somewhere between the small analytical and numerical 
simulation models with plausible parameter values on the one hand, 
and the large empirical macroeconomic forecasting models on the other. 
The former frequently lack realism, while the latter often lack theo- 
retical coherence. It is not possible here to give a complete description 
of the model and of the econometric estimates, which are fully reported 
in Bean, Dinenis, and Probyn (1985), but a brief overview follows. The 
linearized version used for the simulations is, however, reported in full 
in the Appendix. 
2.2.1 
The model is best thought of  as a more developed version of the 
rational  expectations  with  sluggish wage-price adjustment models in 
the tradition of  Dornbusch (1976), Blanchard  (1981), and Buiter and 
Miller (1981a). Supply is disaggregated  into three sectors: manufac- 
turing (corresponding to nonoil tradables), nonmanufacturing (corre- 
sponding to nontradables), and oil and gas (exogenous). Firms operate 
in a monopolistically competitive environment treating factor prices, 
initial holdings of  inventories, and the capital stock as given. Tech- 
nologies are of  the  CES variety.  On the basis  of  factor prices  and 
expectations about the level of demand and competitors' prices, they 
choose appropriate levels of factor inputs, price, and output. The elas- 
ticity of demand, and hence the mark-up, is constant. If sales expec- 
tations  are not  realized,  then  there  is  an unanticipated  buildup  or 
rundown of inventories of finished goods. There is no rationing in the 
goods market. 
The wage equation, which thus determines the level of  unemploy- 
ment via labor demand, is of the Sargan (1964) real-wage-resistance 
type. Consequently, changes in the wedge between the consumption 
and product wage will affect the NAIRU. However, in the short run 
the nominal wage is predetermined, and an acceleration in inflation will 
produce a fall in real wages. 
Domestic demand comprises consumption, investment, and govern- 
ment' spending,  which  is  exogenous.  The  consumption  function  is 
An Overview of the Econometric Model 44  Charles R. Bean 
based  on a  standard  life-cycle permanent-income  model,  implicitly 
with backward-looking expectations formation. It relates consumption 
to  post-tax  nonproperty  income,  interest  rates,  and  net  worth  (in- 
cluding housing). A noteworthy feature of the results is the very strong 
negative impact of  nominal rather than real interest rates (see Bean 
1987, which also reports tests of  Ricardian debt neutrality). This ap- 
pears to be a rather robust feature of the data. It presumably reflects 
the interaction of credit rationing effects with the increased front-end 
loading of real mortgage repayments as interest rates rise (see Jackman 
and Sutton 1982). 
Investment depends on “Tobin’s Q,”  but the equations are rather 
novel  in  incorporating time-to-build lags. These make  investment a 
function, not of the current real stock price, but of lagged expectations 
of the current stock price (see Dinenis 1985). 
To obtain the demand for domestically produced goods, two further 
equations are added describing the split of domestic arrd foreign demand 
between domestic manufacturing, domestic nonmanufacturing, and for- 
eign producers. The arguments in these equations are the various rel- 
ative prices, as well as domestic and foreign demand. 
The financial sector of the model comprises a conventional demand 
for (outside) money  equation and a series of  arbitrage relationships 
equating short-term interest rates with the expected returns on long 
bonds, equities, and foreign assets. Rational expectations in asset mar- 
kets are assumed throughout. 
The model was estimated on postwar annual data by  both  single 
equation and systems instrumental variables techniques. The complete 
model has 25  state variables, 21  of which are predetermined and 4  of 
which are non-predetermined (the exchange rate, the long interest rate, 
and manufacturing and nonmanufacturing  stock prices). The simula- 
tions reported here were carried out using Buiter and Dunn’s (1982) 
SADDLEPOINT program for simulating linear rational  expectations 
models, which itself is based on the methods of Blanchard and Kahn 
(  1980). 
2.2.2  North Sea Oil 
I start by considering the impact of oil on the exchange rate. How- 
ever, before presenting the numerical results, it is worthwhile briefly 
summarizing the salient points of  the theoretical literature (see Bean 
1987 for an extensive bibliography). This falls into two parts, one of 
which deals with the medium- and long-term equilibrium implications, 
and the other of which deals with the problem of short-run adjustment 
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As far as the equilibrium implications are concerned, there are two 
primary channels through which the discovery of a natural resource 
affects the economy. The first is via a spending effect, whereby the 
resulting increased demand for consumer goods falls partly on non- 
tradables and domestically produced tradables. The result is a rise in 
the price of  nontradables  to tradables  and, if  domestic and foreign 
tradables are imperfect  substitutes, an improvement in the terms of 
trade. Associated with this will be a shift in resources from tradables 
to nontradables production. 
The second  channel is a resource  effect  whereby  changes in  the 
demand for factors of production lead to changes in factor rewards and 
a consequent change in supply in different parts of the economy. The 
magnitude and direction of this effect depends critically on the mobility 
of labor and capital and the capital intensity of the industries involved. 
However, for the case of  North  Sea oil this  channel is likely to be 
relatively unimportant, since oil extraction utilizes very little labor, and 
the required capital can be obtained from abroad. 
As far as short-run adjustment is concerned, Eastwood and Venables 
(1982) have discussed the issue in a Dornbusch-style model. They point 
out that one would not expect the discovery of oil to lead to a general 
recession because the requisite deterioration in competitiveness occurs 
instantaneously via a nominal exchange rate appreciation rather than 
domestic price adjustment. Only if  there is a lag between discovery 
and the resulting increase in demand will a recession occur, because 
forward-looking behavior in exchange markets brings forward the com- 
petitiveness deterioration ahead of the increase in demand. In view of 
the backward-looking nature of the consumption function in the model 
used for the simulations and the fact that the government did not de- 
liberately cut taxes and increase the budget deficit ahead of extraction, 
this is an important proviso. 
Table 2.2  presents the results of a counterfactual simulation designed 
to answer the question: How did the discovery of oil and the increase 
in oil prices affect the exchange rate and the level of activity? In the 
base case oil production is set to zero, and real oil prices are held at 
their 1973 level. The table then gives the percentage changes in some 
key variables from this base scenario as a result of the discovery of 
oil and the two oil  price  hikes.  I  have assumed that the volume  of 
reserves and production were correctly evaluated (their value, net of 
extraction costs, varies with the oil price and the exchange rate and is 
assumed to be zero prior to the first oil price shock); each of the two 
oil price shocks were unanticipated and regarded as permanent; real 
government spending and tax rates are kept constant (so the budget 
deficit and the stock of government debt vary endogenously); monetary Table 2.2  Effects of North Sea Oil and Oil Price Shocks (Percentage Changes) 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Nominal exchange rate  6.2  7.0  7.4  8.4  9.5  10.6  22.7  23.4  24.3  24.6  25.0 
Real exchange rate  8.2  7.7  7.1  7.2  7.4  7.9  19.3  19.5  20.4  20.7  20.7 
Manufacturing employment  1.0  -2.0  -0.5  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  1.3  -1.8  -1.4  -  1.7  -1.7 
Services employment  -1.0  -0.5  -0.8  -0.7  -0.6  -0.5  0.3  I .o  I .2  1.1  1.1 
Consumer price inflation  1.2  -1.1  -1.2  -1.0  -0.8  -0.7  -1.9  -0.5  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 47  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
policy is nonaccommodatory; and effects on world activity and interest 
rates are ignored. The assumptions on fiscal and monetary policy are 
certainly debatable, but it is not clear what other assumptions would 
be more appropriate. 
Turning to the figures themselves, we see that the effect of the second 
oil price shock is to produce an 11% appreciation of the real exchange 
rate (12% nominal) in 1980, that is, it explains a little less than half of 
the real appreciation that actually occurred. This is in the same ball 
park as many previous estimates (see Bean 1987 for a survey), although 
rather smaller than those furnished by Forsyth and Kay in their seminal 
piece. There is no subsequent depreciation, but this is because the real 
oil price has been held constant after 1980. In practice, of  course, it 
has now roughly halved. The model suggests that a permanent  10% 
fall in oil prices produces a real depreciation of 1.25%, so that around 
a 7% real depreciation since 1981 could be expected from the subse- 
quent decline in oil prices. The simulation also displays an Eastwood- 
Venables-style recession in  the interregnum between  discovery  and 
exploitation. In the post-1980 period, when most fields had come on 
stream, we find the classic Dutch-disease scenario of a contraction in 
manufacturing output and an expansion in services employment. (The 
rather  peculiar  increases  in  manufacturing  employment in  1974 and 
1980 are due to the fact that the model treats oil and labor as substitutes 
in production and that a deterioration in competitiveness only affects 
demand with a lag-a  somewhat dubious property of the model.) Thus 
while the discovery and exploitation of oil and sterling’s status as a 
petrocurrency  help to explain the decline in manufacturing, they do 
not seem to adequately explain the overall increase in unemployment. 
One possibility is that the model simply underestimates the problems 
of absorbing unemployed workers from manufacturing into the services 
sector because of  skill and regional mismatch. The other explanation 
lies in the contractionary policies pursued by  the Conservative gov- 
ernment, a question to which I now turn. 
2.2.3 
The 1980 appreciation of sterling is frequently attributed to the adop- 
tion of a more restrictive monetary stance by the authorities as part 
of a wider counterinflationary  strategy involving both a reduction in 
government expenditure and a reduction  in  the government deficit. 
Buiter and Miller (1981b) provide an eloquent exposition of this view- 
point. If  inflation adjusts sluggishly, a reduction in monetary growth 
will, they claim, lead to an increase in domestic real interest rates and 
a temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate. On this view, the 
reduction in current and future monetary growth announced as part of 
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the government’s Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) provided 
the immediate catalyst for the appreciation of sterling and the attendent 
recession (contractionary fiscal policy had a role to play here as well). 
Buiter and Miller attribute the lion’s share of the blame here and ascribe 
only a subsidiary role for oil. 
How well does this story stand up? To  begin with, there is some 
debate over whether monetary policy was indeed contractionary. As 
table 2.3 makes clear, the growth of fM3, the government’s chosen 
target aggregate, was actually fairly rapid through 1980 and 1981, and 
certainly well above the target ranges of 7- 11% and 6-lo%,  respec- 
tively. However, the growth rate of  M1, and especially the monetary 
base, was much more modest.  Coupled  with the rise  in  short-term 
interest  rates  that  occurred, it  is  difficult  not  to believe  that  some 
monetary deceleration had taken place and that the disparate signals 
given by the various monetary aggregates was the result of innovations 
taking place within the financial sector (such as changes in the saving 
behavior of the private sector and in the pattern of corporate finance). 
The ex post reduction in nominal GDP growth also supports this view. 
While  it  is  not  difficult  to  sustain the argument that a  monetary 
deceleration had  indeed  occurred, the consequences of  it  are more 
debatable. Buiter and Miller (1983) note that there are problems in their 
earlier view inasmuch as the ex post real interest rate differential ac- 
tually moved significantly against the United Kingdom in  this period 
(see table 2.4).3  Further, the question arises as to whether  there is 
enough nominal rigidity in the economy to explain the facts. 
Table 2.4 presents the estimated effects on the same set of key vari- 
ables of the (unanticipated) introduction of a disinflationary program 
in which the rate of monetary growth is reduced by 1 percentage point 
per year for five years (starting in  1980), after which the rate of mon- 
etary growth is permanently  lower by  5  percentage points. This sort 
of gradualist approach represents the intention, if  not necessarily the 
execution, of the monetary side of the MTFS. It is assumed that the 
program is credible, so that agents in financial markets, who are en- 
dowed with rational expectations, correctly foresee the implications. 
This is not, of course, true of wage bargainers  who have backward- 
looking inflationary expectations.  The nominal exchange rate appre- 
ciates 17% on impact, but the real exchange rate appreciation is a more 
modest 9%. The overshoot predicted by  the Dornbusch-Buiter-Miller 
approach is present, but it is not very pronounced. More noticeable is 
the significant reduction in inflation and a modest expansion in overall 
employment (although manufacturing employment shows a small de- 
cline after the first year as J-curve effects work through). The reason 
for this is that although there is a degree of nominal inertia in the wage 
equations, it  is  really  not  that  significant. Wage demands  moderate Table 2.3  Selected Monetary Indicators 
Ex Post Real 
Rate of Growth  Rate of Growth  Rate of Growth  3-Month  Rate of Growth  Interest 
of Monetary Base  of M1  of EM3  Interest Rates  of Nominal GDP  Differential 
1978  15.0  16.3  15.6  11.9  15.4  - 
1979  10.1  9.1  13.2  16.5  15.  I  1.4 
1980  5.6  4.0  18.7  13.6  16.4  7.4 
1981  1.1  11.0  13.5  15.4  9.2  2.5 
1982  3.8  11.3  14.6  10.0  8.5  -  0.3 
1983  6.4  8.4  5.9  9.0  9.2  - 
Sources: Finunciul Statistics (various issues), Economic Trends Annual  Supplement, 1987, and Buiter and Miller (1983). 50  Charles R. Bean 
Table 2.4  Effects of  Progressive Reduction in the Rate of  Monetary Growth 
(Percentage Changes) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Nominal exchange rate  17.2  21.9  25.8  31.0  36.4 
Real exchange rate  9.2  7.7  7.9  7.0  7.0 
Manufacturing employment  1.2  -  1.1  -  0.6  -  0.6  -  0.8 
Services employment  0.5  1.2  1.5  1.8  1.9 
Consumer price inflation  -9.0  -  5.2  -5.3  -5.3  -  5.4 
along with the fall in import prices, resulting in a further fall in consumer 
prices and a decline in nominal interest rates. Because nominal rather 
than real interest rates influence consumer demand (see above), the 
latter actually rises. A long-run real appreciation is necessary  to ac- 
commodate this increase in  consumer demand. While the simulation 
therefore goes some way to explaining the behavior of the exchange 
rate, it does not seem to capture the rise in unemployment. Thus, on 
the basis of this simulation at least, monetary policy does not  seem 
capable of bearing the full weight of the ~tory.~ 
A central feature of  the argument  is obviously the low degree of 
nominal inertia in  wage-setting behavior.  A considerable amount of 
recent research has confirmed the view that the European economies 
in  general, and the  United  Kingdom in  particular,  suffer from real, 
rather than nominal, wage rigidity (see for instance Branson and Rotem- 
berg 1980, Grubb, Jackman, and Layard 1983, and Newell and Symons 
1986). Indeed, Layard and Nickell (1986), in one of the most complete 
recent studies of United Kingdom labor market behavior, actually find 
no nominal inertia whatsoever in their annual wage equation. If  any- 
thing, the degree of  nominal inertia present in the model used here is 
actually rather greater than independent evidence suggests. 
Of course one can always appeal to Lucas critique type arguments 
for doubting the relevance of  econometric  estimates  for simulating 
policy shifts in the face of a change in  regime. However, one would 
normally have expected them to overstate, rather than understate, the 
amount of nominal inertia in the face of an announced, credible, pro- 
gram of  disinflation. I  am therefore  rather inclined to discount  this 
explanation. 
An  alternative view  is to lay the blame not  solely at the door of 
restrictive monetary policy, but to a combination of  restrictive mone- 
tary policy and adverse developments on the supply side. The winter 
of  1978-79  saw the breakdown of  the  Labor government’s  “social 
contract”  with the unions and a wave of  strikes, particularly  in  the 
public sector, resulting in significant wage increases for large groups 
of workers. While this winter of discontent was a major political factor 51  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
leading to the election of Mrs. Thatcher, the Conservatives agreed to 
honor the increases granted to public sector workers. This in turn led 
to further private sector wage demands, and the result was a significant 
acceleration in the growth of average earnings from an annual rate of 
12.3% over 1976-78  to 17.2% over 1978-80.  The growth in real earn- 
ings was less marked-around  2%  in  1979 and  1980-but  since then 
the real incomes of those in work have continued to rise, along with 
the level of unemployment. 
Layard and Nickell (table 10) estimate that between  1975-79  and 
1980-83  the NAIRU rose by around 2 percentage points, a significant 
part of  which is attributed to the breakdown in incomes policy, a re- 
surgence in union militancy, and increased structural mismatch. Now 
one would expect an adverse movement in aggregate supply such as 
this to lead not only to a decline in employment, but also to a crowding 
out of net exports via an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Table 
2.5 therefore reports the effects of a permanent fall in the NAIRU of 
2 percentage points, starting in 1979. The result is a 12% appreciation 
of both real and nominal exchange rates (with a small overshoot), as 
well as a decline in employment which is heavily concentrated in the 
traded goods sector. 
I conclude from this that while the monetary contraction alone does 
not seem to be a major factor behind the sterling appreciation, a com- 
bination of tight monetary policy and a deteriorating supply-side position 
can explain a real appreciation of upwards of 12%, to add to the 12% or 
so attributed to oil. Together this is of the same order of magnitude as 
that actually experienced. Most of this movement is, however, due to 
changes in underlying fundamentals, and only a very small part repre- 
sents a temporary misalignment due to Dornbusch-style overshooting. 
However,  aside from  any  qualms  one might entertain  about  the 
model-and  there are many-one must also feel rather uncomfortable 
with this sort of ex post historical exercise, because there are just too 
many degrees of freedom around in the way of exogenous shocks and 
expectations of future variables to impose much discipline on the re- 
searcher. By a judicious choice of these, one can always fit the facts. 
Table 2.5  Effects of a 2 Percentage Point Increase in the NAIRU 
(Percentage Changes) 
1979  1980  1981  1982  I983 
~ 
Nominal exchange rate  11.6  11.1  10.1  9.5  9.2 
Real exchange rate  11.6  12.4  11.9  10.4  9.6 
Manufacturing employment  -  1.1  -5.2  -4.9  -4.3  -4.1 
Services employment  -  0.8  -  1.7  -  2.4  -2.6  -2.4 
Consumer price inflation  -  1.2  1.1  0.3  -0.3  -0.5 52  Charles R. Bean 
Consequently I remain cautious about the conclusion that overshooting 
due to the monetary contraction was not a major feature of the appre- 
ciation. Rather the results represent just a little bit more evidence to 
add to the growing pile on exchange rate misalignment and the eco- 
nomic consequences of Mrs. Thatcher. 
This analysis ignores the possibility of a misalignment other than as 
a result  of  the interaction of  a contractionary  monetary  policy  and 
nominal inertia. An  alternative viewpoint is that the appreciation of 
sterling was simply the consequence of a bubble (rational or  otherwise). 
There is now an extensive empirical literature rejecting uncovered in- 
terest parity (see, e.g., Fama 1984 and the references therein), although 
the absence of a well-formulated alternative hypothesis makes it dif- 
ficult to know how bad an assumption it  is or how to interpret  the 
findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that a random-walk model of  the 
exchange rate seems to dominate any other explanation. Evans (1986) 
does, however, report evidence that at least in the 1981-84  period the 
sterling-dollar rate  was  subject to a bubble,  and Meese  (1986) also 
reports evidence suggesting that both the sterling-dollar and dollar- 
deutschemark rates have been subject to bubbles since the advent of 
floating. Finally, Frankel and Froot (1985) construct an account of  the 
1981  -84  period, which in  part relies on irrational speculation. Con- 
sequently it would be rash to conclude that the greater portion of the 
1979-80 sterling appreciation was necessarily a response to movements 
in fundamentals. While a bubble could account for the behavior of the 
exchange rate, however, it does not simultaneously  seem capable of 
explaining the concomitant rise  in unemployment  given the limited 
nominal inertia in wage setting. 
2.3  Permanent Effects from Transitory Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
Whatever the cause of a movement in the real exchange rate, it will 
usually be accompanied by changes in the real economy. The 1979-81 
real appreciation has now  been  largely reversed, but  the possibility 
remains that it may have had a lasting impact on British trade perfor- 
mance. In this section I shall examine the empirical evidence for such 
hysteresis effects. 
2.3.1  Demand Effects 
Quotes like that of Vickers in their evidence to the House of Lords 
Select Committee and the observation that industrialists attach a great 
deal of significance to maintaining their market share suggest that hys- 
teresis effects in goods markets are likely to be important. Within the 
industrial organization literature there is a considerable body of work 
discussing the advantages that accrue to incumbent firms. On the de- 53  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
mand side one can think of at  least three arguments as  to why hysteresis 
effects might arise. First, incumbents may produce such a wide variety 
of differentiated products that it may be difficult for new entrants to  find 
a niche (Schmalensee 1978). Second, uncertainty about product quality 
may lead consumers to stick with products that they have already pur- 
chased, rather than trying out the brands of new firms (Schmalensee 
1982). Finally, there may  be significant costs in  some industries in 
switching suppliers (Klemperer 1987). All of these suggest that the de- 
mand for a firm's product may depend on its previous level of sales. 
Rather than subscribe to any one particular theory for such state 
dependence, I shall use an eclectic, although rather ad hoc, approach 
and simply assume that consumer tastes are related to the past history 
of consumption. To motivate matters, suppose a representative con- 
sumer's tastes over the domestic product, X,  and the foreign product, 
X,  are given by: 
(1)  U = A(X-  1)X" + B(K  I)X*'  (p < 1) 
with A', B'  >O.  Then, assuming the consumer ignores  the effect of 
current choices on future  taste^,^ the relative demands are given by: 
(2)  (X/X)  = (A/B)"(P*/P)" 
where P and P*  are the prices of the two products and u = 1/(1 - p) 
is the elasticity of substitution. It remains to parameterize A and B. It 
is convenient to write A  = AoXe,  B  = BOX*',  in which case: 
(3)  A(x  -  x*) = u (a0 - bo) + a(p* -  p) + (a8 - I)(x-~ - x*-,) 
where A  denotes the difference  operator and lowercase letters will 
henceforth be used to denote logarithms. Thus when 8 = l/a, we have 
pure hysteresis, and a transitory increase in the relative price of X will 
have a permanent effect on its share. 
Because we are interested in the question of  whether transitory shocks 
have durable effects, it makes sense to look at evidence over as long 
a time period as possible.  Confining attention to just a few years of 
data is likely to severely limit the precision with which one can make 
inferences about such long-run effects. Further, very short-lived fluc- 
tuations, for example, lasting a month or so, are unlikely to affect trade 
permanently, because they can be insured against in the forward mar- 
ket. Rather one is interested in the effect of movements that last, say, 
a year or two. To this end I shall present estimates using (annual) data 
on British export performance going back to the beginning of the cen- 
tury taken from Alford et al. (1971). Although the arguments above 
could equally well apply to the home market, attention is restricted to 
export markets, because it is impossible to disaggregate the imports 
of goods data for most of the period between raw materials and inter- 54  Charles R. Bean 
mediate inputs on the one hand and finished goods on the other. By 
contrast, British visible exports are almost exclusively finished goods 
(prior to North Sea oil) and hysteresis arguments seem most relevant 
to this market. 
Thus X  is the volume of British nonoil visible exports, while as a 
proxy for x",  consumption of foreign products in the rest of the world, 
I use United States GNP  (consumption of British products is, of course, 
only a tiny fraction of this). P is the associated UVI (AVI prior to 1950) 
converted into dollars at the prevailing exchange rate, whilst P* is the 
dollar UVI for world manufactured exports (UN series). Since much 
of British trade in the early years of the century was concentrated in 
the colonies and more latterly has been directed to Europe, the use of 
U.S. data to proxy x" is obviously less than perfect, but it is impossible 
to obtain a suitable world GNP variable for most of the period. How- 
ever, to control for this and the changing structure of  British export 
markets, I have included as an additional exogeneous variable, S,  the 
share of  exports to the  United  States in  the  total  value  of  British 
exports. To control for the increasing integration of world markets since 
the Second World War, I have also included the ratio of world trade in 
manufactures to world manufacturing output, Z, (both UN series). 
The ratio of  United Kingdom nonoil exports to United States GNP 
is plotted  in  figure 2.1, while the price of  United  Kingdom exports 
relative to that of world manufacturers is plotted in figure 2.2.  (Note 
that for convenience the series have been rescaled for the earlier pe- 
riods.) Figure 2.2 reveals another benefit in looking at a long historical 
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Fig. 2.1  U.K. export share. 
Note:  1980 = 33 for data 1900-1913. 
1980 = 66 for data 1921-38. 
1980 =  100 for data 1948-85. 
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Fig. 2.2  Relative U.K. export prices. 
Note: 1980 = 130 for data 1900-1913. 
1980 = 100 for data 1921-38  and 1948-85. 
nounced fluctuation, there are other periods when relative prices have 
moved quite sharply. Thus inferences are not likely to be unduly influ- 
enced by the experience of a single historical  period (and moreover 
one when many aspects of both the British and the world economy 
were in a state of flux). 
We  begin by  considering  the stochastic  properties of  the  various 
series in the demand equation. Table 2.6 reports the coefficient cp from 
the first-order autoregression: 
(4)  Ay  =  constant + m.trend + qy-, 
where  y  = x, x*,  x -  x*,  p -  p*,  s,  z.  (In practice  we  also allow 
for different intercepts either side of the world wars.) Although the 
t-statistic on  cp  does not  in fact have a  t-distribution  under the null 
hypothesis that  cp  = 0, it can nevertheless  be  used  to test this  hy- 
pothesis  if  the  critical  values  reported  in  Dickey  and Fuller  (1981) 
are used  instead. On the basis of  these results, one would probably 
conclude that x,  x*, and z can reasonably be treated as nonstationary 
stochastic  processes,  while  x -  x*,  p -  p*, and  s are best  treated 
as stationary processes  around a deterministic trend. 
Having established this, it is then natural to ask whether x,  x*, and z 
are cointegrated. Two or more series, which are themselves nonsta- 
tionary, are said to be cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987) if  some 
linear combination of them is stationary. It is clear from (3) that if (p -  p*) 
is a strongly exogenous stationary stochastic process and 8 = I/a,  then 
x  and x* cannot be cointegrated. Engle and Granger consider various 
ways of testing whether two or more nonstationary series are cointe- 
grated. One procedure, which I follow here, is to regress one of the series 56  Charles R. Bean 
Table 2.6  Stochastic Properties of Various Time Series 
Series  (P 
x  -0.103 
(I .64) 
X*  -0. I19 
(2.08) 
(2.83) 
P-P*  -0.278 
(3.02) 
S  -  0.334 
(3.77) 
Z  0.005 
(0.10) 
x-x*  -0.264 
Notes:  Sample: 1901- 13, 1922-37,  1949-85;  ?-statistics in parentheses 
on the others and then test whether the residual from that regression is 
stationary using either the Durbin-Watson statistic (it should be zero un- 
der the null hypothesis of no cointegration) or a Dickey-Fuller type test. 
The results of carrying out this procedure are presented in table 2.7. 
Equation (1) gives estimates of the long-run relationship between x,  x*, 
and z, while equation (2) presents a Dickey-Fuller type test of whether 
the residual in equation (l), P, is stationary, as would be the case if x, 
x*,  and z  are cointegrated. This test is based on the t-statistic of 2-  ,, 
although once again cognizance must be taken of the fact that it does 
not have a t-distribution when P is a random walk, and that f is also a 
generated regressor. Engle and Granger provide Monte Carlo evidence 
on the distribution of both the Durbin-Watson statistic in equation (1) 
(their 5,  statistic) and the coefficient on k-  I  in equation (2) (their t2  sta- 
tistic). Using their results we are able to accept, at the 95% level, the 
hypothesis that x,  x*,  and z are indeed cointegrated. 
However, the finding that x and x*  are cointegrated does not nec- 
essarily imply the absence of hysteresis effects in export markets if 
(p -  p*)  is not strongly exogenous. This may be seen by considering 
the following example. Suppose that the demand equation is given by: 
(5)  A(x -  x*) = cx  (p* -  p) + u  (CX > 0) 
where u is some stationary stochastic process, and supply is given by: 
(6)  (p" -  p) =  P(x* - x) + v  (p > 0) 
where u  is another stationary stochastic process. Then it is straight- 
forward to show that 
(7)  (x - x*) =  (u + av)/[(l  + ap) - LI 57  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
Table 2.7 
(1)  x  = - 0.65 +  0.620, +  O.llDz - 0.0016t +  0.854~*  + 0.517~ 
Cointegration Test for r,  x*, and z 
(0.88)  (3.93)  (1.06)  (0.46)  (5.86)  (5.13) 
Sample period:  1900-1913,  1921-37,  1948-85; 
Standard error (%) = 7.64; Durbin-Watson = 0.88. 
AX = 0.0029 - 0.481L~ 
(0.39)  (4.72) 
Sample period:  1901-1913,  1922-37,  1949-85; 
Standard error (%) = 6.12; Durbin-Watson =  1.37. 
Notes:  t-statistics in parentheses. DI = 1 in 1900-1913 and 0 otherwise. Dz =  1 in 1921- 
37 and 0 otherwise. 2  is the residual from regression  1. 
where L is the lag operator. Thus (x -  x*)  is a stationary stochastic 
process even though (5)  exhibits a hysteresis effect. 
Table 2.8 presents instrumental variable estimates of the export de- 
mand equation itself, treating the current relative price as endogenous. 
Since the United  Kingdom is a small supplier at the global level, it 
seems reasonable to treat p* as (weakly) exogenous, and so the addi- 
tional instruments are those factors determining United Kingdom ex- 
port prices vis-a-vis current and lagged values of  wages and raw material 
prices, relative to the foreign price level, and (economywide) produc- 
tivity. In addition there are the shift variables  s and z, as well as a 
number of dummies to take account of  special factors. These are a 
dummy for the impact of the general strike (1 in  1926, -  1 in  1927); a 
dummy to take account of the 1972 dock strike (1 in 1972, -  1 in 1973); 
a dummy to partial out the effect of  the Korean war (1  in  1951 and 
1952); and a dummy to partial out the effects of widespread introduction 
of restrictive trade measures at the onset of the Great Depression (0.5 
in  1930 and 1 in  1931). One might expect this last effect to be picked 
up by the ratio of world trade in manufactures to world manufacturing 
output, z, which drops precipitously at this time, but it does not seem 
to capture everything. In addition, 1908 is clearly an outlier, for some 
unidentifiable reason, and a dummy taking the value  1 in  1908 and 0 
elsewhere is also included. The coefficients on these dummies and the 
intercepts, which differ each side of the world wars, are omitted from 
table  2.8 for brevity.  I  have also generalized  the dynamic structure 
slightly by introducing additional lags on the exogenous variables to 
produce an error-feedback model. 58  Charles R. Bean 
Table 2.8  Estimates of  Export Demand Equation (Dependent variable: 
A(x - x*) 
Sample period:  1901-13,  1923-37,  1949-85. 
Equation  (1)  Equation  (2) 
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I  .97 
3.63 
12.75 
(m = 9) 
Notes:  t-statistics  in  parentheses. A dagger (7)  denotes an instrumented variable.  Ad- 
ditional instruments are (p, -  p'), (p,,, -  p*)-,,  (w -  p*),  (w -  p*)Ll,  log (government 
spending  +  investment)  -  log (labor  force),  log (manufacturing  productivity)_  I. 
(p' -  P)-~.  Coefficients on constants and dummies are omitted for brevity. The instru- 
ment validity test is due to Sargan (1964), and the LM test for serial correlation is due 
to Breusch and Godfrey (1982). 
Equation (1) of table 2.8 reveals a statistically significant levels effect 
from relative prices, but the error-feedback term (x - x*)-, is small in 
magnitude and rather insignificant. This is certainly very suggestive of 
a hysteresis effect. Equation (2)  omits the error-feedback term, as well 
as the levels terms in x*, z, and s. This is easily accepted (~~(4)  = 4.99) 
and the coefficient on the level of prices remains  highly  significant, 
implying that a transitory movement in relative prices has a permanent 
effect on the export share. The results in this column imply that each 
point-year of overvaluation of the exchange rate results in a permanent 
loss of export share of 0.25%. Thus a 20% overvaluation sustained for 
two years would result in a loss of share of  10%. This is a pretty large 59  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
effect, and one might feel hesitant  in  pinning so much  faith in  the 
statistical significance of the error-feedback coefficient. However, even 
if  one settles for equation (1),  in which there are no long-run effects 
from transitory  fluctuations in  the real exchange rate, adjustment is 
still very slow-the  mean lag is over five years-and  from a practical 
point of  view there may be little to choose between pure hysteresis 
and just very long lags. 
2.3.2  Supply Effects 
The possibility of hysteresis effects on the supply side of the goods 
market has been suggested recently by Baldwin and Krugman (1986). 
They show how significant fixed costs of entry into a market, for ex- 
ample, the cost of  setting up a distribution network, can mean that 
large temporary exchange rate movements have permanent effects on 
the pattern of trade. To illustrate the argument, suppose the maximum 
level of profits the firm can earn at any point in time, IT,, is driven by 
a white-noise process, and the fixed entry cost is N. Let V,(V,) be the 
expected present value to the firm of being in (out) of the market. Then 
the firm will enter if  IT  >  IT/  where  IT^  = N + 6(V, - V,)  and 6 is the 
(constant) real discount factor. Similarly the firm will exit if  IT  < IT(,, 
where  IT() =  6(Vo - VI).  Clearly  IT/  > IT,.  Thus a  sufficiently large 
deterioration in profitability, for example, due to an overvaluation of 
the real exchange rate, may lead to profits falling below the critical 
level IT(, and the firm leaving the market. However, it will only reenter 
if profitability recovers sufficiently to ensure that profitability exceeds 
the level  IT^.  If profitability was originally in the range IT,  < IT  <  IT^, a 
temporary deterioration in  profitability will have a permanent effect. 
Thus a large temporary undervaluation may be necessary  to restore 
the position ab initio. 
A  very  similar story with essentially the same outcome as above 
could be told invoking the role of investment by incumbents in deterring 
entry (Dixit, 1980). Yet another argument for hysteresis effects on the 
supply  side comes from the presence  of  technical  progress through 
“learning-by-doing’’ (Kaldor 1966; Van Wijnbergen 1984). If the level 
of total factor productivity depends on past levels of output, then a fall 
in  output today, due to,  say, a loss in  competitiveness,  will  lower 
productivity in the future and reduce  supply for any given level of 
factor prices. 
Baldwin and Krugman go on to consider how their argument is af- 
fected if there are many industries with different fixed entry costs and 
profitability and argue that aggregation will  not eliminate or smooth 
away the discrete trigger feature of the model. Evaluating this model 
econometrically is not an easy matter, however, especially in the ab- 
sence of data on entry costs. In order to capture the spirit, if  not the 
letter, of this idea, I have therefore estimated a model of supply behavior 60  Charles R.  Bean 
in export markets in which producers incur adjustment costs in chang- 
ing the level of  exports, and these adjustment costs may be different 
according to whether exports are increasing or decreasing. Specifically, 
suppose a representative exporting firm solves the following problem: 
1 
- PFAK.5 -  g(Am)l~, 
where W is the wage, PM  is the price of  raw materials, and PK  is the 
price of  capital.  c(.)  is  a restricted cost function (excluding any ad- 
justment costs) with the usual properties, while g(.) is an adjustment 
cost function. IR, is the information set available to the firm. Then the 
associated Euler equation for X between t and t  + 1 is simply (omitting 
t subscripts): 
(9)  P(1 - ]/a)  =  C'  + g' - 6Eg'+l 
where u  is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand (which 
will be assumed constant). 
To  render (9) operational econometrically, we need to parameterize 
the two components of the cost function. As far as marginal costs are 
concerned, I assume a Leontief  technology  in  value-added and raw 
materials, while the value-added function is Cobb-Douglas6 in labor, 
L,  and capital, in which case: 
(10)  c'  = a(WL/X)  +  PP" 
For the adjustment cost function I assume the following form: 
P*[y+AX  + (~+/2)(h;y)*]  if  AX > 0 
(1 1)  s(M? = {  P*[y-AX + (E-/~)(AX)~]  if AX < 0 
where y+ > y- and E+ > E- captures the idea that producers may face 
higher costs in entering new markets or expanding in existing ones than 
in  exiting or contracting. It is natural to assume that such costs are 
incurred  as expenditure  abroad, and  hence  I  have written  them  as 
proportional to P* (which also serves to eliminate heteroscedasticity 
from the final estimating equation). 
Finally, I assume that the real interest rate is small so that 8 = 1 to 
give: 
(12)  PIP* = p(WL  lP*x) + F,p(PM/P*) 
- CLyE(AD+,) - ILEE[A(D+,ax+,)l 
- p-E  (A*X+  1) 61  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
where  = a/(a - l), y = y+ - y-, E = E+ -  E- and D  is an indi- 
cator variable such that D =  1  if  AX  > 0 and D = 0 otherwise. 
The presence of the indicator variable complicates estimation a little, 
and I have adopted the following reasonable, but somewhat ad hoc, 
estimation strategy. First, suppose y  = E = 0. Then (12) can be esti- 
mated with standard instrumental variable techniques replacing E(A2X+ 
by its realization A2X+,  and using elements of the information  set R, 
as instruments (e.g., McCallum 1976 and Wickens 1982). However, the 
projections of AD+  I  and A(D+  IAX+  I)  on 0, are nonlinear and in par- 
ticular have the character of a switching regression model. On the basis 
that the asymmetric adjustment costs probably have second-order ef- 
fects on the evolution of X,  at least in the region of the null y  = E = 0, 
I have therefore constructed instruments for these terms as follKws. 
First I projected AX+l  and AX  on the information set to obtain AX+, 
and G.  I then c2structed proxy indicator variables 8,  I sd  8  such 
that D+l  = 1 if  AX+I  >O  and 0 otherwise,And D  =A  lif  AX  > 0 and 
0 otherwise. Finally,  - 8)  and (b+lAX+l  - DAX)  were added 
to the instrument set. 
I have not included the dummies added to the demand equation in 
either the regressor or instrument sets, on the grounds that the occur- 
rence of  strikes, wars, and so forth, is largely unpredictable,  but in 
any case it makes little difference to the results. The measure of wages, 
W,  is an earnings series relating to males in manufacturing, converted 
to dollars. However, since productivity in export (for which read man- 
ufacturing) industries (XlL) is unavailable for the full sample, I have 
proxied it by economywide productivity. Because current productivity 
may not be weakly exogenous in  (12),  I  have also instrumented  the 
current labor cost term (a full list of instruments appears in the table). 
The raw material price variable, PM,  is a series relating to worldwide 
primary product prices. (Ply),  (WL/P*X),  and (PM/P)  have all been 
normalized to unity in  1980 to aid interpretation. 
Equation (1) of table 2.9 presents estimates of the basic model. Since 
there is strong evidence of  serial correlation, and the instruments are 
unlikely to be  strongly exogenous, I  have used  the forward-filtering 
technique of Hayashi and Sims (1983), rather then conventional meth- 
ods, to produce corrected estimates. Of course this serial correlation 
could be symptomatic of a variety of possible misspecifications, but it 
is rather difficult to relax the dynamic specification yet still retain the 
interpretability offered by the theoretical model. 
Both AD+l and A(D+IAX+I)  have the a priori  expected signs, al- 
though only the former borders on significance. There is thus some 
weak support for the idea of asymmetric adjustment costs. The coef- 
ficients on labor and raw material costs both seem plausible, but the 
equation diagnostics are only barely satisfactory. 62  Charles R.  Bean 
Table 2.9  Estimates of  Export Supply Equation (Dependent variable: (PIP')) 
Sample period:  1901-12,  1922-37,  1949-84. 
Equation (1)  Equation (2) 




Serial correlation ~~(2) 
.937 
(23.6  1) 
0.076 
(4.38) 
-  0.031 
(1.73) 







(m =  13) 
0.212 
(1.36) 













(m =  12) 
5.47 
Notes: r-statistics in parentheses. A dagger denotes an instrumented variable. Additional 
instruments are  constant,  trend,  ( WIP')  x  (government  spending  plus  iyvestme?t/ 
IaborLorce),  (AW&/PX)-~,  (PMIP*)-l,  XCI,  X',  X?,, S, XI,  Z, Z-I,  (D+l  ~  D), 
(D+IAX+I  - DW.  Equation  (1) is estimated  using the Hayashi-Sims  (1983) forward- 
filtering technique with serial correlation  parameter of  0.623. 
This version of the model does, however, ignore the sort of hysteresis 
effects investigated in section 2.3.1. If firms realize that a loss of market 
share now will  result in a lower level of  demand, at given prices, in 
the future, then they presumably  will take this into account in  their 
current pricing behavior.  In particular, suppose demand is given by 
equation (3). In that case, if  the firm disregards any effect of its own 
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Equation (2) of table 2.9 therefore augments the basic model with a 
term in (f'+,X+,/X).  This has the merit of  eliminating the serial cor- 
relation, but unfortunately the new term turns out to have a (significant) 
positive rather than a negative sign. Clearly this casts some doubt on 
the validity of the theoretical model. However, the other coefficients 
remain generally  consistent  with  the  view  that it  is  more costly to 
increase exports than  to reduce them.  Nevertheless,  more  work  is 
required to provide convincing evidence of such effects. 
2.3.3  Policy Implications 
The models of sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are somewhat different in 
their implications,  in that the model of  2.3.1 can produce truly per- 
manent effects from a transitory displacement of the real exchange rate 
(when a0 = 1). By contrast, the stationary long-run equilibrium in the 
model of  2.3.2 is independent of  the form of  the adjustment costs, 
which only affect the transition path, with adjustment being slower in 
an upward direction than in a downward direction. In that sense the 
implications are rather different from those of Baldwin and Krugman. 
However, whether transitory shocks really do have permanent, or  just 
long-lived, effects seems largely immaterial in practice. 
The welfare implications are harder to draw out, however, because 
they require some knowledge of  the causes of the fluctuation in the 
real exchange rate. If it is the consequence of a bubble, say, or money 
wage rigidity coupled with a contractionary monetary policy, then state 
dependence in foreign trade merely perpetuates and accentuates the 
welfare losses due to the original market distortion. On the other hand, 
the moral is less clear if  the fluctuations are due to changes in  real 
fundamentals, such as the discovery of  North Sea oil. For if  private 
agents correctly perceive the future implications of current actions (and 
the quote by Vickers in  the Introduction suggests they may do) then 
there is apparently no need for any special action by governments. 
North Sea oil actually provides a very interesting example, since it 
in  fact represents a temporary rather than permanent  change in  the 
United Kingdom's  industrial structure. An obvious, and increasingly 
relevant, question is: What happens when the oil runs out some time 
early in the next century? Hysteresis effects may mean that the res- 
toration of  the status quo ante is not a viable option. This seems to 
suggest that subsidization of the nonoil tradables sector or a policy of 
encouraging a weak exchange rate is desirable. But if firms are aware 
of the problem and correctly internalize the costs of reentering foreign 
markets, the benefits of learning-by-doing, and  so forth, there is no 
role for government intervention during the interregnum whilst the oil 
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This is, I would argue, too sanguine a view, since it ignores market 
imperfections elsewhere in the economy. In particular, consumption- 
smoothing arguments dictate that  the benefits of  oil  be shared with 
future generations, yet the available evidence does not seem to support 
such ultrarational  behavior  by households.  As a result, the level of 
private consumption and the current real appreciation are likely to be 
exce~sive,~  and net investment of  the proceeds from oil by the gov- 
ernment, either directly in real public or private sector capital or in- 
directly through a lower budget deficit, would seem to be called for. 
This would automatically limit the extent of any current real appreci- 
ation and the contraction in the nonoil tradables sector. 
I conclude, therefore, that hysteresis effects in trade may be a cause 
for concern, not only when there are temporary misalignments due to 
irrational speculative behavior or sluggish adjustment of  nominal wages, 
but also when the economy is subject to temporary real disturbances. 
The models and estimates of this section are admittedly crude in the 
extreme, but the results seem sufficiently promising (if that is the right 
word) to suggest that further empirical  work,  most  probably  at an 
industrial level. would be fruitful. 
Notes 
1. This slightly overstates the importance of  oil, because extraction costs 
have not been deducted. However, since marginal operating costs in 1985 were 
around 25% of  the output price, the bias is not that significant. 
2. The subsequent depreciation  can, of course, be attributed to the fall in 
real oil prices since 1980. 
3. However,  Branson (1983) in  his comments points  out that the force of 
this objection is much reduced  if one treats the acceleration  in inflation over 
1979-80  as largely unanticipated. 
4.  Of course contractionary fiscal policy may have raised unemployment. I 
have  carried  out a  simulation  of  the  1979 budget  (a three-point  cut in  the 
standard rate of income tax, and an increase in VAT  [value added tax] from 
8.5 to 15% coupled with a 1%  reduction in government expenditure in the first 
year and 2%  thereafter). The consequence is a fall of 0.5 to 0.75% in employ- 
ment, but concentrated entirely in services, and a real appreciation of 4%. 
5. There is obviously a certain amount of irrationality about this, but I believe 
it is probably more realistic than the alternative of  assuming that that consumer 
takes into account the effect of current purchases on his future tastes. 
6. I have also experimented with CES technologies, but Cobb-Douglas seems 
to work as well as anything. 
7. If households were ultrarational then they would increase current savings 
out of the windfall income from oil in order to finance higher consumption in 65  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
the future. This would automatically tend to limit the current appreciation of 
the real exchange rate and so eliminate any reentry problems. 
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Appendix 
Listing of the Macroeconomic Model 
The equations of  the log-linearized model are: 
pm = 0.19pe + 0.08pn  + 0.73(wm + ty) + 0.17Cym -  km-,). 
pn = 0.12pe  + 0.6pm + 0.28(wn + ry) + 0.276~  - kn-J. 
ym = 0.57~  + 0.2g + 0.83(km -  km-,) + 2.06(kn -  kn-,) + 
yn = 0.664~  + 0.232g + 0.962(km - km -,)  + 2.38 
0.295(p* + e - pm)-, - 0.133sm-,. 
(kn - kn-,) + 0.133(p* + e -  pm) + 0.376(pm -  pn) 
- 0.072sn-,. 
(ym - km-,). 
(yn - kn-,). 
(Im -  ym) = 0.19pe + 0.08pn - 0.27(wm + ry) + 0.17 
(In -  yn) = 0.06pe + 0.32pm -  0.38(wn + ry) + 0.14 
km = km-, + 0.018E-,qm. 
kn = kn-I + 0.0122qn + 0.0125E-,qn. 
sm = 0.974ym  + 0.394sm-,. 
sn = 0.543yn + 0.667~~~. 
Eqm,,  = i + pc -  pc+,  + 1.05  qm -  0.2ym  + km 
Eqn,, = i + pc -  PC+~  + 1.05qn - 0.374yn + kn 
wm = 0.73wm_, - 0.21~m_~  + 0.79~~  - 0.31p~-~  + 1.41. 
wn  = l.lwn-, - 0.5~~~  + 0.5~~  - O.lpc-, + 1.21. 
c  = 0.94~~  + O.O6a-, - 0.45i. 
a  = a_,  + 0.7i-, - (pc -  pc-,) + 0.21(yp -  c) + 0.09 
- 0.929km-,. 
- 0.925kn_,. 
(qm - qm-,) + 0.21(qn - qn-,) - 0.7(iL - iLI). 68  Charles R. Bean 
ws = 0.58ws-,  + 0.3(wm -  pc) + 0.7(wn -  pc) 
- 0.174(wm -  pc)_, - 0.406(wn -  pc)-, + 0.421-,. 
cg = 0.087(wm -  pc) + 0.203(wn -  pc) + 0.29rr - 0.941. 
yp = 0.82~s  + 0.18cg  + q(xo + e -  pc). 
Ee,,  = e  + i - 7. 
EiL+,  = l.liL - 0.li. 
m -  pc = 0.24~  + 0.48(m -  pc)_, - 1.3i. 
y  = 0.3ym + 0.7yn. 
1 = 0.31m  + 0.71n. 
pe = 0.32(pr  + e) + 0.16(po  + e) + 0.16pm + 0.36pn. 
pc = 0.35pm  + 0.55pn  + O.l(p* + e) + tx. 
An m after a letter denotes a manufacturing variable while an n after 
a variable denotes a nonmanufacturing variable. The variables are: 
a 
c  = real private consumption. 
cg  = real current grants. 
e  = nominal dollar exchange rate (price of foreign currency). 
g  = real government spending. 
i  = nominal short-term interest rate. 
iL  = nominal long-term interest rate. 
ki  = capital stock at end of period (i = m, n). 
li  = employment (i = m, n). 
1  = total employment. 
m  = nominal money stock. 
pi  = price of output  (i = m, n). 
p* = price of foreign manufactures (dollars). 
po = price of oil (dollars). 
pr = price of nonoil raw materials (dollars). 
pe = price of material inputs. 
pc = consumer price index. 
qi  = Tobin's Q  (i = m,  n). 
rr  = replacement ratio. 
si  = stock of inventories at end of  period  (i = m,  n). 
tx  = expenditure tax rate. 
ty  = income tax rate (including employers contributions). 
wi  = post-tax nominal wage (i = m, n). 
ws = real post-tax wages and salaries. 
xo  = value of oil rents (dollars). 
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yi  = output (i = m,  n). 
y  = total (nonoil) output. 
yp = private post-tax nonproperty income. 
Equations (l), (2), (3), (4), and (5) determine prices, output, employ- 
ment, the capital stock, and inventories in each sector. Equations (6) 
are arbitrage relationships  determining stock prices, while equations 
(7) determine wages.  Equation (8) is the consumption function, and 
equation (9) determines the level of real wealth as a function of stock 
prices, interest rates, and savings. Equations (lo), (11),  and (12) de- 
termine wages and salaries, current grants, and hence personal dis- 
posable income. The coefficient q = 0.037 when the United Kingdom 
is considered to be an oil producer and q = 0 when the United King- 
dom is considered not to be an oil producer. Equation (13) is the un- 
covered interest parity condition, (14) is the arbitrage condition for 
long bonds, and (15) is a conventional demand for money function. 
Equations (16) to (19) are quasi-identities determining total output and 
employment and the price of inputs and consumer prices. All variables 
are in logarithms except the interest rates and Tobin’s Q. 
Comment  Willem H. Buiter 
This is a very interesting paper which opens up a range of important 
theoretical, empirical, and policy issues. In my  comment I can only 
hope to explore the tip of this rather large iceberg. 
The paper falls into two parts that are connected fairly loosely. In 
the first part, the linearized version of  a small econometric model of 
the U.K. economy, specified and estimated by the author, is used to 
evaluate the contributions of monetary policy, the discovery and ex- 
ploitation of North Sea oil, and a number of adverse supply shocks to 
U.K. economic performance over the period of  1978-81,  with special 
reference to the real exchange rate. The second part is a theoretical 
and empirical  exploration of  the significance of  hysteresis,  or path 
dependence, in various dimensions of U .K. economic behavior, that 
is, of  the phenomenon  that temporary  shocks may  have permanent 
consequences. Weaker interpretations of  this concept characterize as 
hysteretic any high degree of  persistence of  shocks to the demand for 
and supply of U.K. output, to equilibrium output, to the trade balance, 
and so forth. I discuss these two main sections of  the paper in turn, 
after some brief comments on the econometric model. 
Willem H. Buiter is professor of economics at Yale University and a research associate 
at the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 70  Charles R.  Bean 
The Model 
The econometric model is a  IS-LM, aggregate demand-aggregate 
supply model with rational expectations in the (efficient) financial asset 
markets,  some real and financial asset dynamics,  and  a rather rich 
supply side. The three-sector model of production distinguishes a man- 
ufacturing sector, a nonmanufacturing  sector, and an oil sector. The 
manufacturing-nonmanufacturing  split corresponds to the traditional 
traded-nontraded goods distinction. Oil production is exogenous. Apart 
from  the familiar caveat that many  of  Britain’s services are highly 
traded (financial, shipping and other international transportation, tour- 
ism, education,  etc.) this  sectoral disaggregation  is  appropriate and 
important for understanding the recent behavior of the U.K. economy. 
The government budget  identity  is  not considered explicitly. This 
can be justified on the grounds that, in the model, the U.K. economy 
is  specified as a small open economy on the financial side.  Capital 
mobility is perfect, interest-bearing financial claims at home and abroad 
(including government debt) are perfect substitutes, and the world rate 
of interest is taken to be parametric. These assumptions are appropri- 
ate, however, only if the U.K. government is, and is perceived to be, 
solvent. If  current and prospective future deficits imply some risk of 
partial or complete repudiation or default, the assumption of a perfectly 
elastic world supply of funds schedule will cease to be correct. It should 
therefore be checked, in the simulations, that the behavior implied for 
public debt and deficits is indeed consistent with solvency. Cuts in tax 
rates that are never (expected to be) reversed or balanced by future 
spending cuts or increases in future seigniorage are, for example, likely 
to be inconsistent with solvency (pace the Laffer curve and/or “fiscal 
increasing returns”). 
The Sterling Real Exchange Rate 1979-81 
Between 1978 and 1981, sterling’s real exchange rate (as measured 
by relative producer prices) appreciated by 23%. Using different price 
or cost indices, the real appreciation (and the subsequent real depre- 
ciation) can be made to look even more dramatic, reaching over 40% 
for  the  IMF’s  series  for  normalized  relative  unit  wage  costs  in 
manufacturing. 
Four possible causes of this appreciation can be distinguished: mon- 
etary policy shocks, fiscal policy shocks, oil, and adverse supply shocks. 
In spite of the erratic and high growth rates of the U.K. government’s 
initial monetary target, sterling M3, there can be little doubt that money 
became tight in Britain shortly after the new Conservative administra- 
tion assumed office in  1979. The degree of tightening, actual and ex- 
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monetary aggregates (M,  and MI),  nominal and real interest rates, and 
so forth. It would of course be improper to infer the degree of monetary 
tightness from the behavior of the exchange rate if our aim is to assess 
the effect of tight money on the exchange rate. Tight money should 
only have first-order real effects, including effects on the real exchange 
rate, if there is nominal inertia or stickiness in  the wage-price mech- 
anism. Empirical evidence suggesting that the degree of nominal inertia 
in  the  United  Kingdom (and in  most other European economies) is 
very limited would, if  it were convincing, weaken or even undermine 
completely the monetary interpretation of the real appreciation. On the 
other hand, the fact that the real appreciation was temporary and has 
by now been reversed to a large extent is consistent with a monetary 
interpretation. 
Fiscal policy works the wrong way, at any rate with regard to the 
behavior of the real exchange rate. With a floating exchange rate and 
a high degree of international capital mobility, tight fiscal policy causes 
a real (and a nominal) depreciation. The real depreciation will in this 
case be permanent unless the fiscal contraction is reversed. The fiscal 
contraction in the United Kingdom during 1980-81 was indeed reversed 
after 1982. While fiscal policy can help explain the depth of the 1979- 
81  recession in the United Kingdom (and the subsequent recovery) it 
renders more difficult the explanation of the behavior of sterling. 
Bean’s model (correctly in my  view) ignores any direct supply-side 
effects of the oil discovery and of the coming-on-stream of oil produc- 
tion. The oil industry certainly faced a perfectly elastic supply schedule 
of  foreign  capital  and had  a very  small impact  on  the demand for 
nonproduced domestic resources such as labor and land. 
Modeling the oil shocks is difficult. Bean’s specification seems as 
reasonable as any: the volume of reserves and production were cor- 
rectly  evaluated but  assumed zero prior  to the first OPEC oil  price 
shock. Each of  the two oil price shocks is viewed as unanticipated, 
immediate, and permanent.  The fiscal aspects of  oil  are important, 
since the government appropriated  an increasing  share of  the rents 
during the period under consideration. This share has reached 80 or 
90% by now. In the oil shock simulations, real government spending 
and tax rates are kept constant. Given the backward-looking nature of 
the consumption function, anticipated future oil revenues would have 
influenced consumption today only through  their effect on forward- 
looking financial asset prices. Since only the deficit and the debt are 
assumed to be affected by the oil revenues, even this financial trans- 
mission channel will  be inoperative under the assumption of perfect 
capital mobility. Alternative current and anticipated future responses 
of  spending and/or tax rates could have produced quite different sim- 
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The contractionary effects attributed to oil discoveries or oil price 
increases (in the case of  a next exporter) come either through lags in 
spending (Eastwood and Venables 1982) or through a wealth effect on 
the demand  for money  (Buiter and  Purvis  1983). Wealth effects on 
money demand seem unlikely with Bean’s narrow monetary aggregate. 
Spending lags are more likely, given a backward-looking consumption 
function, absence of debt neutrality, and a fiscal policy that did not, in 
the early years of the Thatcher regime, reduce taxes or raise public 
spending by the annuity value of the increase in oil wealth. 
The adverse-supply-shock view of the causes of the real depreciation 
summarizes the winter of discontent (1978-79)  and its aftermath by a 
2-percentage-point increase in the natural rate of unemployment. The 
sign of the effect obviously goes in the right direction (with regard to 
both the real exchange rate and real output), but it seems sufficiently 
ad hoc to warrant being treated with caution.  Surely by  now these 
temporary effects have worn off after eight successive winters of con- 
tent and significant legislative initiatives curbing union power. The real 
exchange rate indeed has come down again, but unemployment and 
activity have not recovered. 
Bean’s reminder  that  the greater  portion  of  the  1979-80  sterling 
appreciation may have been due to a speculative bubble rather than to 
a movement of fundamentals is appropriate. A definitive decomposition 
of the “Thatcher wiggle” in the real exchange rate remains to be done. 
Permanent Effects From Temporary Misalignments 
The second half of the paper concerns the continuing  saga of  the 
unit root, the infestation of martingales and random walks that after 
affecting observables like the stock market, the nominal and real ex- 
change rates, and consumption, now touches unobservables like the 
natural rate of unemployment. 
Bean investigates whether there is hysteresis, or  path dependence, in 
British trade performance, that is, whether temporary shocks (e.g., to 
competitiveness) have permanent consequences for British exports, X, 
relative to world imports X.  P is the price of British exports, P* the 
appropriate foreign price index, and both are measured in terms of  a 
common currency. The (demand) equation that is tested in given in (1). 
(1)  A(X - X),  = j, + j,(P* - P),  + j2(X - x*),-,. 
If  the restriction j2 = 0 is accepted, there is hysteresis  in  British 
export  demand  as there is a unit  root  in  the X  -X  process.  The 
hysteresis issue is then approached by considering whether X  and x* 
are cointegrated. If P -  P* is strongly exogenous and stationary and 
if j, = 0, then X  and X  cannot be cointegrated. Finding that the null 
hypothesis that X and X  are not cointegrated cannot be rejected (i.e., 73  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
that X  and x" are cointegrated) therefore implies (if P -  P* is a strongly 
exogenous stationary process) that j, # 0.  However, John  Huizinga 
(1987) finds that his real exchange rate measure for the United Kingdom 
(which is similar but not identical to Bean's P -  P* measure) is non- 
stationary (the univariate representation of his real exchange rate pro- 
cess has a unit root). Doubts must also exist with regard to the strong 
exogeneity of P -  P*.  Strong exogeneity of P -  P* is weak exogeneity 
plus Granger noncausality (i.e., the nonpredictability  of P -  P* from 
past values of the other variable(s), once the predictive content of past 
values of P -  P* has been allowed for). Granger noncausality can in 
principle  always be tested,  (although no tests  were  reported  in  the 
paper), but the assertion that P - P* is weakly exogenous always relies 
on a priori assumptions, that is, it can only be tested together with 
other restrictions on the model. Let Zand Ybe matrices of observations 
on 2 and I: The joint likelihood function can be written as L (Al,  X2; 
Z, n,  where XI  contains the parameters of interest and X2 the nuisance 
parameters.  Z  is weakly  exogenous if  L(hl,h2;Z, n = Ll(hl;Y/BL2 
(h2;Z). In that case the parameters of interest are confined to the like- 
lihood in  Y conditional on 2. In a simultaneous demand-supply equi- 
librium model, weak exogeneity of price with respect to quantity seems 
unlikely (although this will of  course depend on what the parameters 
of interest are). 
If X  and x" are cointegrated, then a linear combination of the two 
is stationary and the behavior of each of them can be described by an 
error-correction mechanism. 
More precisely, let Z(i)i  = 0,1,2 . . . denote the order of integration 
of a stochastic process. AZ(i)), denotes a stochastic process integrated 
of order i.  A  set of  variables, each of  them Z(1)  is cointegrated if  a 
linear combination of them is Z(0).  Let X  and x* both be I(  1). They are 
cointegrated if 
(2) 




where Ibll  + lb21 # 0. 
This decomposition into error correction and short-run dynamics 
does not seem to be unique, however. If X,  and X,  are cointegrated, 
for example, so are X,  and x",-  I,  since (2) can be written as 
X,  = a0  + qXt* + flZ(O)),. 
Ax  = 61 f(m)t-  I  + Am), 
U,  = b2f(I(O),-1  + j(I(O)), 
xt  = a0  + UIX-1 + al(X - X-I) +f(mv),. 74  Charles R. Bean 
x  -  X,_,  is Z(0)  and a,(x  -  x*,-,)  + f(Z(O)),  = f(Z(O)),  is therefore 
also Z(O),  as it is the sum of two stationary stochastic processes. The 
error-correction mechanisms in (3) and (4)  therefore can be rewritten 
as 
= b’l f(m),-  I  + hO)), 
and 
AX”,  = br2f(Z(0))f-l  + .?(Z(o)),. 
The decomposition of the AX  and AX dynamics into a long-run error- 
correction component and a short-run disequilibrium-adjustment com- 
ponent therefore seems not uniquely identified, limiting the usefulness 
of these exercises. More generally, if  X,  and X;  are cointegrated, so 
are X,  and X,  -j for any finite j. 
Bean considers equation (1) to be a representation  of the demand 
side of the U.K. export market. The paper also contains a specification 
and estimate of a supply equation. His discussion in section 2.3.1 shows 
clearly that hysteresis in the demand side need not imply hysteresis in 
the equilibrium quantities. It isn’t quite clear to me whether we should 
be interested primarily in demand-side hysteresis, in supply-side hys- 
teresis, or in hysteresis in the equilibrium quantities. 
The discussion of  the economic mechanisms  that  might generate 
hysteresis  at times  seems to take  us far from  the narrow  or strict 
definition of hysteresis. A strictly hysteretic dynamic system is one for 
which the steady-state or long-run values (distributions) of the endog- 
enous variables depend not only on the steady-state values (distribu- 
tions) of  the exogenous variables but also on the initial conditions of 
the state variables and on the values of the exogenous variables during 
the adjustment process: how you get there determines where you get 
to. In discrete time, linear dynamic systems hysteresis is present when 
there are one or more unit roots. Adjustment costs do not in general 
imply hysteresis. Irreversibilities may well imply hysteretic behavior, 
but this is unlikely to show up in the form of a linear process with unit 
roots. Nonlinearities (such as kinked oligopolistic demand curves) may 
generate local hysteresis, but not the global hysteresis of linear systems 
with unit roots. In the end, the paper tries to identify a weaker (and 
perhaps more relevant) form of hysteresis, that is, long lags and a high 
(but not  perfect) degree of persistence in the behavior  of important 
economic variables. 
If  we detect hysteresis (even perfect hysteresis), should we worry 
about the working of the economic system? A priori, the presence of 
hysteresis in  equilibrium prices or quantities is not a cause for alarm 
and does not indicate a malfunctioning of the economy. Consumption 
may follow a random walk in economic systems in which the invisible 75  Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance 
hand is doing a marvellous job. In an economy in which uncovered 
nominal interest parity holds, the real exchange rate will follow a ran- 
dom walk if the authorities pursue a policy of equalizing ex ante real 
interest rates at home and abroad. This will be true when the economy 
is a neoclassical wonderland or a sticky-price, Keynesian unemploy- 
ment world in which, under a different policy regime (such as a random 
walk for the level or growth rate of  the nominal money stock) over- 
shooting of nominal and/or real exchange rates could occur. 
In conclusion, this very interesting paper points towards a range of 
unresolved theoretical and empirical issues concerning hysteresis: (1) 
the distinction between strict hysteresis and weaker notions of a high 
degree of persistence; (2) the distinction between hysteresis in partic- 
ular decision rules (e.g., demand or supply) (or structural-form hys- 
teresis)  and  hysteresis  in  equilibrium  variables  (or  reduced-form 
hysteresis); (3) the distinction between deep hysteresis (such as the 
hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment that may come out of 
human capital or insider-outsider mechanisms) and shallow hysteresis, 
such as the hysteresis of the real exchange rate reflecting a particular 
monetary or fiscal policy; (4) the need for a careful welfare economics 
of hysteretic behavior. The presence of hysteresis is not prima facie 
evidence of an externality. 
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